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Inflation, Monetary Policy and Stock Market Conditions: 







This paper examines the association between inflation, monetary policy and U.S. 
stock market conditions during the second half of the 20
th century.  We use a latent-
variable VAR to estimate the impact of inflation and other macroeconomic shocks on 
a latent index of stock market conditions.  Our objective is to investigate the extent to 
which various shocks contribute to changes in market conditions, above and beyond 
their direct effects on real stock prices.  We find that disinflation shocks promote 
market booms and inflation shocks contribute to busts.  Further, we find that inflation 
shocks can explain more of the variation in real stock prices when stock market 




I.  Introduction 
The association between monetary policy and the performance of stock and other 
asset markets has long piqued the interest of economists and policymakers.  Stocks are 
claims on real assets and, hence, monetary neutrality implies that monetary policy should 
not affect real stock prices in the long run.  Although real stock returns and inflation have 
been negatively correlated historically (Fama and Schwert, 1977), the correlation is 
widely seen as an anomaly resulting from the simultaneous impacts of real economic 
activity on inflation and stock returns (Fama, 1981).
1   
Despite the presumed irrelevance of inflation for real stock returns in the long run, 
researchers have found considerable evidence that monetary policy can affect real stock 
prices in the short run.
2  Further, economists have conjectured that the nature of the 
monetary policy regime can affect the performance of asset markets over longer horizons.  
Goodfriend (2003), for example, argues that before 1980 the policies of the Federal 
Reserve and other central banks were an important source of macroeconomic and 
financial instability that could explain the negative correlation between real stock prices 
and inflation.  Rising inflation, for example, tended to depress stock returns because 
higher expected inflation would increase long-term interest rates (and thereby raise the 
rate at which investors discount future dividends) and because monetary policy actions to 
limit inflation would tend to slow economic activity (and thereby depress current and 
forecast earnings).
3   
                                                                                          
1  See also Lee (1992) or Rapach (2001; 2002).  By contrast, Modigliani and Cohn (1979) argue that the 
negative correlation between stock returns and inflation reflects “inflation illusion” on the part of investors.  
For supporting evidence, see Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) and Ritter and Warr (2002).   
2  See Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and He (2006), and references therein for estimates of the short-run 
impact of monetary policy on stock prices.  
3  Some economists argue that asset price bubbles or other forms of financial instability are more likely 
when monetary policy fails to maintain a stable price level (e.g., Schwartz, 1995; Woodford, 2003). 
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The “Fed model” of stock returns, which links market returns to inflation through 
nominal bond yields has had considerable success as a historical description of stock 
prices (Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004), and many observers believe that disinflation 
contributed to the U.S. stock market boom of the 1990s, as well as to booms historically.
4  
Indeed, at a Federal Open Market Committee meeting in 1996, Chairman Alan 
Greenspan observed: 
We have very great difficulty in monetary policy when we confront stock market 
bubbles.  That is because, to the extent that we are successful in keeping product 
price inflation down, history tells us that price-earnings ratios under those 
conditions go through the roof.  What is really needed to keep stock market 
bubbles from occurring is a lot of product price inflation, which historically has 
tended to undercut stock markets almost everywhere.  There is a clear tradeoff.  If 
monetary policy succeeds in one, it fails in the other.  (FOMC meeting transcript, 
September 24, 1996, pp. 30-31)
5 
Thus, while monetary policy and inflation probably have little or no long-run impact on 
real stock returns, the view that monetary policy can affect stock returns and/or market 
conditions in the short-to-intermediate run both through unanticipated policy shocks and 
through its impact on inflation is widely held.   
This paper presents new evidence on the impact of inflation and other 
macroeconomic shocks on the U.S. stock market over the second half of the 20
th century, 
focusing especially on the effects of various shocks on stock market conditions.  We are 
particularly interested in capturing differences in the impact of inflation and other shocks 
between “normal” periods and periods of extreme price movements – “booms” and 
                                                                                          
4  Bordo and Wheelock (2007) review the histories of major 20
th century stock market booms in the United 
States and nine other countries and find that booms usually arose when inflation was below its long-run 
average, and that booms typically ended when inflation began to rise and/or monetary authorities tightened 
policy in response to rising or a threatened rise in inflation. 
5  Borio and Lowe (2002) argue similarly, contending that disinflation can promote financial imbalances, 
including stock market bubbles. 
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“busts.”
6  We employ a latent-variable vector autoregression (Qual-VAR) model to 
estimate the impact of macroeconomic shocks on the growth of real stock prices and 
stock market conditions.  By explicitly taking account of market conditions, the Qual-
VAR is well suited to studying experiences that fall outside the norm, such as stock 
market booms and busts, that may comprise relatively little of the overall sample variance 
of stock price movements.  Thus, the Qual-VAR provides evidence about whether 
relationships observed during booms or busts differ from those of periods that could be 
characterized as normal.   
Our research has some similarities with studies of bull and bear stock markets.  
Chen (2007), for example, finds that the impact of monetary policy shocks on returns 
depends on whether the market is in a bull- or bear-market state.  Chen (2007) also finds 
that contractionary monetary policy increases the probability of the market switching 
from a bull- to a bear-market state.  Similarly, Lunde and Timmermann (2004) find that 
changes in interest rates have asymmetric impacts on the duration of bull- and bear-
markets.
7  However, unlike Chen (2007), Lunde and Timmermann (2004), and other 
studies of bull and bear markets that assume that the market is always in one or the other 
state, our approach enables us to focus on periods of extreme movements in real stock 
prices by allowing for a third, “normal” state.  If most observations actually belong to a 
middle or normal category, then models that force observations to lie within either a bull 
or bear state will necessarily result in estimates that fail to reflect fully the differences 
between the extreme states.   
                                                                                          
6  We do not take a stand on whether booms and busts reflect a disconnection from fundamentals, or simply 
exceptional optimism or pessimism about fundamentals.  Discussions of such phenomena include 
Kindleberger (1989) and Shiller (2005).  Shiller (1981), of course, spawned a large literature on the 
apparent excessive volatility of stock prices relative to fundamentals. 
7  Other recent studies of the characteristics of bull and bear markets include Maheu and McCurdy (2000) 
and Pagan and Sossounov (2003). 
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Qual-VAR models have been used to examine recessions, where researchers are 
interested in estimating relationships during periods of unusually weak activity that 
nonetheless account for relatively little of the overall sample variance of output (e.g., 
Dueker, 2005; Dueker and Nelson, 2006).  However, unlike recession dates, which a 
researcher can reasonably treat as data, the identification of when the stock market is in a 
boom or bust state inherently involves judgment on the part of the researcher, which is a 
potential drawback of the basic Qual-VAR approach.
8  To address this drawback, we use 
a hybrid approach that combines an otherwise standard Qual-VAR model with a dynamic 
factor model.  This hybrid model allows the data to partly identify market conditions 
guided by our initial classification of periods of exceptionally rapid and prolonged 
increase in real stock prices as booms and periods of significant decline as busts. 
From the Qual-VAR estimation we find evidence that inflation shocks have had a 
large impact on the U.S. stock market historically, with disinflation shocks promoting 
booms and inflation shocks promoting busts.  Interest rate shocks also have had a 
significant impact, with unexpected increases in the long-term interest rate pushing the 
market toward a bust and unexpected rate declines moving the market toward a boom.  
Further, our counterfactual analysis indicates that disinflation shocks can explain more of 
the stock market boom of 1995-99 than output shocks, and that inflation shocks also 
contributed to prior episodes of market instability.  Our results are thus consistent with 
the view that a policy regime that minimizes unanticipated fluctuations in inflation can 
contribute to financial market stability. 
                                                                                          
8  See Harding and Pagan (2006) for warnings about working with constructed classifications.  This 
problem arises in many contexts, e.g., in studies of financial or currency crises (e.g., Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999).   
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Section II describes our econometric model and approach for identifying market 
conditions.  Section III presents estimation results and a counterfactual exercise to 
identify the importance of various shocks on market conditions throughout the period 
spanned by our data.  Section IV concludes. 
II.  Estimating the Impact of Macroeconomic Shocks on Real Stock Prices and 
Market Conditions 
Several studies have investigated the impact of macroeconomic shocks on stock 
market variables using vector autoregression techniques.
9  However, unlike prior studies, 
we focus on the extent to which macroeconomic shocks can explain changes in stock 
market conditions, and whether the impact of shocks on real stock prices historically has 
varied with the market’s condition.  Relatively little of the overall sample variance of 
stock returns involves shifts between boom and bust conditions because those episodes 
occur infrequently.  Hence, estimates from models that do not account for the condition 
of the market will be heavily influenced by variation in the data within normal periods.  
Our latent variable vector autoregression (Qual-VAR) approach can provide evidence 
about whether the relationships we observe during booms and busts differ from those of 
more ordinary market conditions.  The latent variable we estimate for stock market 
conditions is designed to emphasize shifts between boom, normal and bust conditions and 
de-emphasize variation within each regime.  In this way, we can focus on investigating 
which types of shocks are associated with shifts between boom and bust stock market 
conditions.   
A potential drawback of the basic Qual-VAR approach to modeling stock market 
conditions stems from its reliance on the subjective determination by the researcher of 
                                                                                          
9  Recent examples include Lee (1992), Rapach (2001), and Hayford and Malliaris (2004). 
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when the market is in a boom or bust state.  In making use of a constructed chronology of 
financial booms and busts, one has to decide how heavily to rely on the judgmental dates.  
If they are given full credence, a multivariate dynamic ordered probit approach, such as 
the Qual-VAR from Dueker (2005) and Dueker and Nelson (2006), would treat the 
constructed chronology as part of the data.  However, in the absence of widely accepted 
criteria for identifying differences in market conditions, we adopt the hybrid approach 
described below that makes the determination of market conditions at least partly 
endogenous, and thereby lessens the influence of our own judgments about how to define 
booms and busts.  This approach could be applied in other settings where the 
identification of an episode being studied is based on ad hoc criteria. 
Another reason to adopt the hybrid approach is that in a Qual-VAR, the latent 
variable in the vector autoregression is understood to represent the data-generating 
process for the posited boom-bust states.  Because we define booms (busts) as extended 
periods of rapid rise (decline) in stock prices, however, a boom (bust) classification from 
the middle of the boom (bust) is to some extent a function of subsequent stock returns.  
This type of data-construction dependence is not captured by a vector autoregression in 
which variables are functions of lags and contemporaneous shocks.  In the hybrid model, 
the latent variable is freed from having to represent the data-generating process for the 
constructed reference chronology.   
Econometric Model 
To fix ideas, consider a generic unobserved component state-space model with the 
following state equation, where  X  are the observable variables and z is the latent 
unobserved component: 
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The measurement equation is 
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As an example of the Qual-VAR approach, consider the following relationship 
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normal state iff c z c






The constants   are estimated and serve as truncation limits for the latent variable, 
based on the three categories of stock market conditions.  Imposing these truncation 
limits on the latent variable is tantamount to treating the boom/bust classifications as 
data.  This approach is used in the Qual-VAR model, which is a multivariate dynamic 
probit in which a continuous latent variable lies behind observed qualitative categories.  
Alternatively, the unobserved components model in equations (1) and (2) can be a 
dynamic factor model in which the latent variable takes on whatever values best explain 
the observed data vector 
12 , cc
X  over time. 
In this paper, we adopt a hybrid approach that bridges the Qual-VAR model and 
the dynamic factor model.  The hybrid approach consists of running two state-space 
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models in parallel.  The first is a Qual-VAR model that imposes the truncation limits on 
the latent variable implied by our ex ante determination of market conditions.  The 
second model ignores our judgmental determination and amounts to a dynamic factor 
model.  In both cases, the state-space form is that of equations (1) and (2).  The only 
difference between the Qual-VAR and dynamic factor versions is the imposition of the 
truncation limits on the latent variable in the Qual-VAR, but not in the dynamic factor 
model.  The Qual-VAR model is used to generate a vector of mean values for the latent 
variable.  The vector is then randomized around these means using the variance implied 
by the dynamic factor model to obtain the sampled values: 
DP DF
tt tt sampled value z z e +   = σ  
where DP denotes a value implied by the Qual-VAR (dynamic probit) model, DF refers 
to the dynamic factor model and e is a standard normal shock.  Note that the sampled 
values of the latent variable need not conform to the truncation limits imposed in the 
Qual-VAR.  Also note that, in keeping with the Bayesian nature of the estimation 
procedure outlined here, one can easily scale the variances up or down.  A scaling factor 
less than 1.0 implies a greater degree of confidence in the ex ante determination of 
market conditions, which amounts to a stronger prior on their relevance.  Similarly, a 
scaling factor greater than 1.0 amounts to a weaker prior on the ex ante determination.  
We set the scaling factor to 1.0, which we consider to be a neutral baseline value, to 
generate the results presented here. 
A key property of the hybrid procedure is that the draws of the latent variable can 
lie outside the truncation limits and so the model-implied category for a given 
observation can differ from the category assigned to it by the researcher.  Nevertheless, 
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unlike the dynamic factor model, by centering the randomization of the latent variable at 
the values implied by the ex ante determination, the latent variable is tailored to reflect 
the judgmental determination on average across the sample period.  In this way, the 
hybrid Qual-VAR / dynamic factor model helps overcome the “what does the factor 
represent?” question that hinders interpretation of dynamic factor models.  At the same 
time, however, the hybrid model also addresses concerns about the accuracy with which 
the researcher assigned observations to particular categories. 
We estimate our hybrid model using a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
estimation procedure in which the randomized values of the latent variable are treated as 
a proposal value in a Metropolis-Hastings step.  This proposal draw is either accepted or 
rejected depending on how the draw fits the data density.
10  The proposal density has the 
mean implied by the Qual-VAR and the variance implied by the dynamic factor model.  
The data density is derived from the forecast errors for the observed data  X conditional 
on a vector of values for the latent variable .  According to the Metropolis-Hastings 
sampling algorithm for the latent variable, the proposal value is accepted with probability 
z











⎧ ⎫ ⎪ ⎪ = ⎨ ⎬
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The current values of the  time series vector are retained if the proposal value is 
rejected by a uniform draw on the unit interval, where the acceptance probability is 
he roposal density for the latent variable vector and
old z
α,g is 
t  p f is the arget density for the data 
conditional on a set of values for the latent variable.  
 t
                                                                                          
10  See Chib and Greenberg (1995) for details about the estimation procedure. 
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Probit models are nonlinear regressions.  Even though we are working in a vector 
autoregression framework, the latent variable leads to a nonlinear response of the 
macroeconomic variables to a change in stock prices.  If a change in stock prices is 
associated with a change in market conditions, say from normal to boom, then the effect 
is magnified (or possibly dampened) relative to a change in stock prices of the same size 
that is not associated with a change in conditions.  This nonlinearity arises because the 
latent variable is relatively constant within each category of market conditions but 
undergoes sizable jumps between categories.   
Data and Model Specification 
We use the hybrid Qual-VAR / dynamic factor model to estimate the effects of 
output, inflation, and interest rate shocks on real stock prices and the latent variable 
representing market conditions.  First, we identify extended periods of exceptional 
increase or decline in real stock prices (the nominal S&P 500 index deflated by the 
Consumer Price Index) using the approach of Pagan and Sossounov (2003).  Specifically, 
we identify peaks and troughs in the real stock price within rolling, 25-month windows.  
To ensure that peaks and troughs alternate, we eliminate all but the highest maximum 
occurring before a subsequent trough and all but the lowest minimum occurring before a 
subsequent peak.  We classify as booms all periods of at least 36 months from trough to 
peak with an average annual rate of increase in the real stock price index of at least 10 
percent or of at least 24 months with an annual rate of increase of at least 20 percent.  We 
define market busts as all periods of at least 12 months from a market peak to a market 
trough in which the index declined at an average rate of at least 20 percent per year.  
Following Pagan and Sossounov (2003), we also treat the 1987 stock market crash as a 
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bust even though the stock market decline lasted for less than 12 months.  Similarly, we 
also treat the 10-month decline in 1966 as a bust.  Table 1 lists the boom and bust periods 
we identify and the average annual percentage change in the stock market index during 
each episode.  For comparison, the real stock price index rose at an average annual rate of 
4.4 percent throughout 1947-2004.   
As described above, our estimation procedure uses the boom and bust periods 
listed in Table 1 as starting values, but the implied classifications for individual periods 
are determined endogenously by fitting the model to the data, thereby reducing the extent 
to which our estimation results are driven by our personal judgments about how to define 
booms and busts.  Our ex ante determination of market conditions guides the sampling of 
the latent variable but some percentage of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo draws for a 
given observation will imply a different classification than the one we chose.  For 
example, not all draws will have zt > c2 within periods listed as booms in Table 1.  
Figures 1-3 show the percentage of Qual-VAR draws in which the given model-implied 
stock market category corresponds with the market booms and busts listed in Table 1.  
For example, Figure 1 shows the proportion of draws for which zt > c2 within periods 
designated ex ante as booms (indicated by the shaded regions).  For the most part, the 
figures show that a high proportion of the model-implied draws of the latent variable lie 
within the categories we identified ex ante.  Note, however, that the proportions are by no 
means constant during these periods, illustrating the difference between the latent market 
conditions variable and the ex ante determination of market booms and busts. 
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III.  Estimation Results 
The hybrid Qual-VAR / dynamic factor model allows us to present results through 
familiar vector autoregression tools such as impulse responses and variance 
decompositions.  These tools are available once we specify an ordering of the VAR 
variables.  The selected ordering also permits us to conduct counterfactual analysis by 
way of shutting down one structural shock at a time and then calculating counterfactual 
histories of the model variables.  In doing so, we can investigate the extent to which stock 
market conditions would have differed over our sample period in the absence of various 
shocks. 
We are interested in estimating the impact of shocks to output, inflation, and 
various other nominal variables on real stock prices and market conditions.  To apply 
standard VAR tools to our hybrid model, we identify shocks through the following 
ordering of variables: (log) industrial production, inflation, 10-year Treasury security 
yield, 3-month Treasury bill yield, real stock price index, and the latent stock market 
variable (z), representing market conditions.
11  The variables are ordered so that variables 
that are pre-determined to a greater extent appear first.  Because this model includes both 
stock returns and the latent variable for boom-bust conditions, we know of no structural 
model that would separate these two shocks other than through the ordering.  Besides, 
available theoretical models on “animal spirits” in stock markets do not lend themselves 
to identifying structural shocks in vector autoregressions.  In ordering the stock market 
variables last, we assume that stock market shocks have no contemporaneous impact on 
the other variables in the model, which seems preferable to assuming that monetary 
                                                                                          
11  We experimented by also including money stock growth and by reversing the order of the 10-year and 3-
month Treasury security yields.  In so doing we obtained results that are qualitatively similar to those 
reported here except as noted below.  See the appendix for variable definitions and data sources. 
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policy and output, for example, have no contemporaneous impact on the stock market.
12  
We use monthly data for August 1952 – December 2005, and six lags in the Qual-VAR 
autoregressions. 
Figure 4 presents impulse responses of the real stock price index (S&P 500) and 
stock market conditions for output (industrial production) and inflation shocks.  The 
figures show point estimates and the bounds of two standard deviations on either side of 
the point estimates.  The initial impacts of output shocks on the real stock price index and 
on market conditions are both positive, but die out quickly and are not statistically 
significant.  By contrast, inflation shocks have a negative, statistically significant and 
persistent impact on both the real stock price and market conditions.  Not only do positive 
inflation shocks reduce the real stock price, they also move market conditions away from 
boom and normal states toward busts.  Moreover, the impact on stock market conditions 
appears to induce further decline in real stock prices.  In a simple VAR model that 
excludes the latent stock market conditions variable, inflation shocks account for only 25 
percent of the variance of the real stock price at a 36 month horizon – a horizon at which 
the central bank is certainly responsible for the thrust of inflation shocks.  However, in 
our latent-variable model, which allows both a direct effect of inflation on stock prices 
and an indirect effect via stock market conditions, inflation shocks account for almost 33 
percent of the variance of real stock prices.  Thus, our latent variable approach captures a 
                                                                                          
12  Evidence on whether or not the Fed reacted to the stock market boom of the 1990s has been mixed.  
Rigobon and Sack (2003) use an identification scheme based on the heteroskedasticity of stock returns to 
sort out the simultaneous response of equity prices and interest rates.  They estimate that during 1985-99, a 
5 percent rise in the S&P 500 stock price index increased the likelihood of a 25 basis point policy 
tightening by about one half.  Cecchetti (2003) also concludes that the Fed tightened in response to the 
booming stock market in the 1990s.  On the other hand, Hayford and Malliaris (2004) estimate a forward-
looking Taylor Rule and find no evidence that the Fed reacted to the stock market during the 1990s, and 
Meyer (2004) contends that the Fed did not react systematically to movements in the stock market during 
his tenure as a member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 1996-2002. 
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quantitatively important channel by which inflation shocks affect real stock prices 
through their impact on stock market conditions. 
Figure 5 shows the impacts of shocks to interest rates on the stock market index 
and market conditions.  Shocks to the long-term interest rate have a negative, 
statistically-significant and persistent impact on the real stock price.  The estimated 
impact on market conditions is also negative, though statistically significant only for the 
first three months.  Rising interest rates can depress stock prices by raising the rate at 
which investors discount future earnings and/or by reducing the growth rate of earnings, 
and thus it is not surprising to find that interest rate shocks tend to reduce stock prices 
and push the market away from boom conditions.  Controlling for shocks to the long-rate, 
we find that the initial impact of short-term interest rate shocks on the real stock price is 
also negative (though not statistically significant).  The initial impact on stock market 
conditions is positive.  However, over the long-run, short-term interest rate shocks have a 
negative impact on both the real stock price and stock market conditions.
13 
Next we examine the impacts of output, inflation, and interest rate shocks on 
stock market conditions over time by comparing counterfactual values of the latent 
market conditions variable constructed by shutting down individual shocks with values 
estimated from the full model.  The black lines in Figures 6-8 show the posterior mean 
values of the latent stock market conditions variable zt relative to the constants c1 and c2 
that demarcate the bust, normal, and boom regions (c1 and c2 are indicated by the dashed 
                                                                                          
13  We find the impact of short-term interest rate shocks to be somewhat sensitive to whether the short-term 
interest rate is ordered before or after the long-term interest rate in the Qual-VAR as well as to the 
estimation period.  Short-term interest rate shocks are found to have a stronger negative impact on stock 
prices if the short-term rate is placed before the long-term rate in the variable ordering, and also when the 
estimation is restricted to the post-1980 period.  It should be noted, of course, that shocks to short-term 
interest rates capture idiosyncratic movements and not the endogenous response of interest rates or 
monetary policy to inflation, output or stock prices.   
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horizontal lines).
14  The grey lines in Figures 6-8 show counterfactual values of the latent 
variable calculated by setting the indicated structural shock to zero.  This provides an 
indication of the importance of various shocks to stock market conditions throughout our 
sample period. 
Figure 6 shows that output shocks can account for little of the change in stock 
market conditions over time, as the simulated path of market conditions is nearly 
identical to the actual path of the latent variable.  Inflation shocks appear to have had a 
more pronounced impact on the market.  Figure 7 indicates, for example, that stock 
market conditions would have been stronger in the early 1990s but weaker later in the 
decade in the absence of inflation shocks.  U.S. inflation spiked following a sharp 
increase in energy prices at the start of the Gulf War in 1990.  Although inflation then 
fell, it remained above historical norms and higher than one might forecast given the 
stance of monetary policy.
15  Our counterfactual series indicates that positive inflation 
shocks kept a lid on the stock market before 1995.  Further decline in the inflation rate in 
the mid-1990s, however, appears to have promoted a boom state during 1995-99 
according to our counterfactual.  In the absence of unexpected decline in inflation, the 
counterfactual suggests the stock market would have dropped out of a boom state in mid-
1997 into the normal region. 
Inflation shocks were also important for U.S. stock market conditions at other 
times over our sample period.  For example, our counterfactual indicates that lower-than-
expected inflation can help explain the stock market boom of 1953-56, whereas higher-
                                                                                          
14  The values shown for c1 and c2 are posterior means estimated under the restriction that c1 < 0 and c2 > 0. 
15  In an op-ed article in the Wall Street Journal on 23 October 1992, Milton Friedman argued that 
“monetary policy has been extremely tight, not easy, in the U.S.”  Noting that M2 growth had fallen below 
2 percent during the prior four quarters, Friedman argued that “continuation of M2 growth at 2% per year 
would imply actual deflation, not negligible inflation.”  In the event, inflation remained between 2.5 and 3 
percent until 1997.   
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than-expected inflation may have contributed to the market bust of 1973-75.  Further, we 
find that stock market conditions would have been decidedly weaker in the absence of 
shocks associated with disinflation in the early 1980s.   
Figure 8 presents a counterfactual path for market conditions in the absence of 
shocks to the long-term Treasury security yield.  The counterfactual series indicates, for 
example, that market conditions might have been stronger in the absence of positive 
interest rate shocks during 1978-81, especially after the abrupt tightening of monetary 
policy in October 1979.  Negative interest rate shocks can help account for the stock 
market boom conditions of the mid-1980s and late 1990s.  Thus, our results indicate that 
unanticipated changes in inflation and interest rates were important determinants of both 
real stock prices and market booms and busts over the post-war era. 
IV.  Conclusion 
Policymakers and others often link the performance of the stock market to 
changes in inflation and monetary policy, especially during extended periods of rapid 
appreciation or decline in real stock prices.  This paper presents an empirical model that 
allows the impact of macroeconomic and policy shocks on real stock prices to vary with 
stock market conditions.  Further, the approach enables us to examine the contribution of 
various shocks to stock market conditions during particular episodes.  Thus, the use of a 
latent boom/bust measure of stock market conditions captures an additional channel 
through which a central bank’s efforts to reduce fluctuations in inflation can contribute to 
greater asset market stability.  Methodologically, our hybrid Qual-VAR / dynamic factor 
model offers an innovative approach to estimating the determinants of asset booms and 
busts that lessens the influence of researcher judgment on the identification of market 
conditions.   
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The evidence reported here provides support for the view that unanticipated 
changes in inflation and interest rates have played important roles in major movements in 
the U.S. stock market since World War II.  We find that inflation and interest rate shocks 
have large, negative impacts on stock market conditions, apart from their effects on real 
stock prices.  Disinflationary shocks, for example, can help explain the U.S. stock market 
boom of 1994-2000, whereas inflationary shocks can help explain the bust of 1973-74.  
The policy lesson we draw concerns not necessarily what policymakers ought to do when 
faced with a bubbling stock market but how they can contribute to equity market stability 
by minimizing unanticipated fluctuations in inflation.  Similarly, the impulse responses to 
long-term interest rate shocks suggest that monetary policies that induce financial 
markets to reduce inflation risk premia in long-term interest rates will promote financial 
market stability.   
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Appendix 
 
This appendix provides information about the data and sources used in this paper.   
 
Stock Price Index:   
 
Standard and Poor's 500 Composite Index, monthly average of daily data.  Source: Haver 
Analytics.   
 
Consumer Price Level:   
 
All Items Consumer Price Index for urban consumers (not seasonally adjusted, 1982-




Index of Industrial Production (seasonally adjusted, 2002=100).  Source: Haver 
Analytics. 
 
Long-term Treasury Yield: 
 
Yield on 10-year constant maturity Treasury security.  Source: Haver Analytics. 
 
Short-term Interest Rate: 
 
Secondary market (discount) yield on 3-month Treasury bills (1953-2005).  Source: 
Haver Analytics. Boom Start Boom End
Avg. Annual 
% Change Bust Start Bust End
Avg. Annual 
% Change
Sept. 1953 Apr. 1956 28.8 Dec. 1961 June 1962 -49.8
June 1962 Jan. 1966 13.3 Jan. 1966 Oct. 1966 -29.2
July 1984 Aug. 1987 22.9 Dec. 1968 July 1970 -26.5
Apr. 1994 Aug. 2000 17.1 Jan. 1973 Dec. 1974 -38.3
Nov. 1980 July 1982 -19.9
Aug. 1987 Dec. 1987 -91.0
Aug. 2000 Feb. 2003 -23.7
Source:  Text.
Table 1
U.S. Stock Market Booms and Busts 
Booms Busts 
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Boom Periods Model-implied Draws of the Latent Variable
Figure 1:   United States Boom Category Model-Implied Draws of the Latent Variable  
 







1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
Bust Periods Model-implied Draws of the Latent Variable
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Normal Periods Model-implied Draws of the Latent Variable
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Figure 6:   United States Counterfactual Simulations - Stock Market 
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Figure 7:   United States Counterfactual Simulations - Stock Market 
















    
Figure 8:   United States Counterfactual Simulations - Stock Market 
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